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Notes
INTERPRETING THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
As an additional means of enforcement, the Clean Water Act contains a provision
authorizing private citizens to bring suit against violators Most courts, until Friends
of the Earth II, have only allowed these citizen suits where there was no pending
agency action or no diligent prosecution of that action. The author argues that this
restrictive interpretation of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision should be dis-
carded in favor of a more liberal application, to better effectuate the letter and spirit
of the Act.
INTRODUCTION
THE FEDERAL WATER Pollution Control Act Amendments,'
enacted by Congress in 1972, established a permit-based scheme
which requires water pollution dischargers to comply with stan-
dards set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).2 To facilitate enforcement of the Act, Congress included a
citizen suit provision3 basically identical to that contained in the
Clean Air Act.4 The Clean Water Act allows citizens to sue viola-
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. - [hereinafter Clean Water Act or the Act].
2. Section 1311(b) of the Act directs the EPA to set effluent limitations prescribing the
technological control standards that dischargers must meet and to set compliance deadlines.
These limitations are enforced through the Act's permit program. Section 1311(a) declares
the discharge of pollutants unlawful unless the discharger has acquired a permit, while
§ 1342(a)(1) states that such permits must require dischargers to comply with the effluent
limitations.
Section 1342(a)(1) provides that the EPA shall issue the requisite discharge permits; how-
ever, under § 1342(b), the EPA may approve state-administered permit programs provided
the state has the ability to implement the program. One facet of implementation is the en-
forcement of the required permit conditions. Section 1342(b)(2)(B)(7) provides that a state
seeking EPA approval of its permit program must have the means to enforce permit condi-
tions, including the imposition of civil and criminal penalties on permit violators, and "other
ways and means of enforcement.' Id State enforcement power is similar to that granted the
EPA under § 1319, which enables the EPA to seek injunctions, civil penalties, or criminal
penalties for permit violations.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
1004, 101 Stat.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1978). The only difference between the citizen suit provisions in
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts is that, under § 1365(a) of the Clean Water Act, civil
penalties may be imposed against the violator. Such penalties are not recoverable by the
citizen plaintiff, but rather are deposited into the Federal Treasury. S. REP. No. 414, 92d
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tors unless the Environmental Protection Agency or a state "has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action
in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance
",5
Many courts interpreting the Clean Water Act's citizen suit pro-
vision have held that an administrative agency may constitute a
court with the agency's enforcement action qualifying as diligent
prosecution. Such a conclusion effectively precludes a citizen suit
under section 1365(b).6 In reaching the decision that an adminis-
trative agency is a "court" and has diligently prosecuted violators,
these courts have failed to develop precise, uniform standards for
determining what agency action will be sufficient to preclude a citi-
zen suit. Instead, the courts have espoused a variety of conflicting
tests.
Recently, the Second Circuit, in Friends of the Earth v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation,7 rejected precedent permitting agency ac-
tion, in some instances, to preclude citizen suits under the Clean
Water Act. The Friends court held that citizen suits are precluded
only if the agency is diligently prosecuting a court action against the
violator.' This holding, unlike the reasoning rejected by the court,
is consistent with the plain language of the Clean Water Act, con-
gressional intent, and the underlying policy considerations. Fur-
thermore, the Friends holding eliminates the danger of applying the
inconsistent and imprecise tests previously developed to determine
when agency action will preclude citizen suits. Because the Second
Circuit's standard, which allows citizens to sue violators unless an
actual court action is pending, comports more precisely with the
language and intent of the Clean Water Act, it should be accepted
as the uniform standard by which future cases are decided.
This Note first analyzes the statutory language and legislative
intent of the Clean Water Act, highlighting the indications that
Congress intended to bar citizen suits only when a court action is
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1982, at 1415, 1497 (1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISToRY]. See also Schwartz & Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the
Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 327, 337 (1984) (citizen plaintiffs cannot seek
civil damages for themselves under the Clean Water Act but may seek civil penalties to be
paid into the Treasury).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. _.
6. See infra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
7. 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Friends II].
8. Id. at 62.
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pending.9 Second, this Note discusses the various judicial interpre-
tations of the provision, focusing on those courts which have held
that a citizen suit may be precluded by agency action independent
of pending court actions.10 This Note considers these decisions mis-
guided because they are not supported by any of the possible policy
explanations.1 Additionally, the failure of those courts to fashion a
meaningfully concrete test to determine sufficiently preclusive
agency action and the danger that might result from inadequate gui-
dance support allowing only pending court actions to prevent citi-
zen suits. 2 This Note concludes that the proper interpretation of
the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision is that citizen suits will
not be frustrated notwithstanding agency action unless an actual
court action is pending.13
I. LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
A. Statutory Language
Following precedent established by the Clean Air Act, 4 Con-
gress included the section 1365 citizen suit provision in the Clean
Water Act to supplement the Act's enforcement provisions."5 This
section provides that "any citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf ... against any person ... who is alleged to be in
violation" of standards established pursuant to the Act.' 6 Section
1365 also specifies the only significant restriction on a citizen's right
to sue violators: "No action may be commenced [by a citizen
against a violator] ... if the Administrator [of the EPA] ... has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action
in a court of the United States... to require compliance with the
9. See infra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
11. See in fra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1978).
15. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (Act's enforcement mechanisms "reinforced by
citizen suit provisions"). See also Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws
Through Citizen Suits A Model, 60 DEN. L.J. 553, 553 (1983) (purpose of the citizen suit
provision in the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts is to encourage "federal agencies and corps
of local private attorneys general to work together to conserve and enhance the country's air
and water resources through administrative actions and private citizen suits."). For a discus-
sion of the Clean Water Act's enforcement scheme, see supra note 2.
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat.
1987]
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[Act]." 1 7
The starting point for interpreting the Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision is the language of the statute itself."8 Section 1365(b)
plainly states that a citizen suit under the Act is precluded only if
the government has instituted a court action against the violator
and the action constitutes "diligent prosecution."19 Because the
language is so explicit, it is difficult to see any justification for al-
lowing certain agency actions not constituting court action to pre-
clude citizen suits.20
A number of other environmental statutes support this reading
of the Act.2" In these provisions, Congress has specifically author-
ized agency proceedings alone to bar private citizens from filing suit
against violators. The fact that Congress did not include such a
provision in the Clean Water Act further supports the view that
only a court action can preclude citizen suits brought under that
Act.22 Thus, the statutory language strongly supports the proposi-
tion that agency proceedings cannot preclude citizen suits under the
Clean Water Act.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. _.
18. "It is a 'familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpret-
ing a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative inten-
tion to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" Friends II,
768 F.2d at 62 (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980)).
19. Friends II, 768 F.2d at 62. "The Clean Water Act citizen suit provision unambigu-
ously and without qualification refers to an 'action in a court of the United States, or a State'
.... It would be inappropriate to expand this language to include administrative enforce-
ment actions." Id.
20. One court explained the rationale:
While many administrative agencies make decisions which are judicial in nature,
... we know of no authority[,] nor has any been cited, that such power affords them
the stature of a court. Absent a clearly expressed contrary legislative intent to a
different meaning, the word "court" as contained in a statute can only mean one
within the judicial structure of the government or a judge thereof, and cannot in-
clude an agency of the executive branch simply because it possesses quasi-judicial
powers.
Department of State v. Spano, 1 Pa. Commw. 240, 245, 274 A.2d 563, 566 (1971).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(B) (1982) (Toxic Substances Control Act); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(2) (1983) (Endangered Species Act); 32 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2) (1982) (Marine Protec-
tion, Research, and Sanctuaries Act); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 98-616, § 401(d), 98 Stat. 3221, 3269-70 (amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1982).
22. Friends II, 768 F.2d at 63. "Congress has frequently demonstrated its ability to
explicitly provide that either an administrative proceeding or a court action will preclude
citizen suits .... Had Congress wished to impose this broader prohibition on citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act, it could easily have done so. It did not." Id.
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B. Congressional Intent
The primary objective of the Clean Water Act is "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters."23 Legislative statements about the Act suggest that
because protecting environmental quality is important to the public
at large, the public should also be authorized to help enforce the
Act.24 Such participation not only builds public confidence in the
government's efforts to improve water quality,2" but also ensures
enforcement of the Act.26
Citizen suits aid in enforcement by motivating the agencies
charged with enforcement responsibility to take action against vio-
lators.27 The possibility that a citizen suit might be brought to en-
force pollution standards, which the agency itself should enforce, is
likely to prod the agency into taking action. Actions to force
agency compliance may occur unilaterally or via the courts.28 If the
agency does not take action to enforce the standards, citizen suits
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat.
24. "Perhaps more than in any other Federal program, the regulation of environmental
quality is of fundamental concern to the public. It is appropriate, therefore, that an opportu-
nity be provided for citizen involvement." 117 CONG. REc. 38,821 (1971) (statement of Sen.
Cooper), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1253, 1306. See also Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("The legisla-
tive history of the Clean Air Act Amendments reveals that the citizen suits provision re-
flected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts .... ); Note,
Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc.: A Reaffirmation of Citizen Suits Policy Within the
Clean Air Act, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 709, 711 (1980) (Clean Air Act citizen suit provision
served to widen "citizen access to the courts, enabling citizens to participate in the fight
against air pollution, which directly affects their health and safety.").
25. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1972), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 753, 819 ("Steps are necessary to restore the public's confidence
and open wide the opportunities for the public to participate in a meaningful way in the
decisions of government.").
26. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1498 (Committee's intent in including the citizen suit provi-
sion was "[t]hat enforcement of these control provisions be immediate."). See also Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("The citizen
suits provision [in the Clean Air Act] reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen
citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would be
implemented and enforced.").
27. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1970). See also Friends of the Earth v.
Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1976) ('Tihe very purpose of the citizens' liberal right of
action [under the Clean Air Act] is to stir slumbering agencies."); Note, supra note 24, at 711
(Clean Air Act citizen suit provision "attempted to motivate and goad the EPA and state
agenices charged with the responsibility of enforcing anti-pollution statutes into appropriate
action.").
28. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
can serve as an "antidote to agency inaction"29 by enforcing the Act
through the courts. As with the Clean Air Act, the public must be
allowed liberal access to the courts to serve the purpose of the citi-
zen suit provision.3"
The statutory restrictions on citizen suits lends additional sup-
port to the assertion that Congress intended to allow considerable
public participation in enforcement of the Clean Water Act. Specif-
ically, the citizen suit provision serves to "facilitate the citizen's role
in the enforcement of the Act, both in renouncing those concepts
that make federal jurisdiction dependent on diversity of citizenship
and jurisdictional amount, and in removing the barrier, or hin-
drance, to citizen suits that might be threatened by challenges to
plaintiff's standing."31
To prevent abuses of the Act's extensive scope, however, Con-
gress imposed three statutory restraints on the use of citizen suits.32
Besides prohibiting citizen suits when the agency has instituted ju-
dicial proceedings and is diligently prosecuting the violator,3 3 the
Act restricts citizen suits only to enumerated violations,3 and re-
quires the citizen to give notice to the enforcement agency and the
violator sixty days prior to the commencement of the suit." These
restraints were thought to be necessary to prevent excessive public
litigation that might effectively frustrate the Act's implementation
and to minimize the burden on the judicial system.36
The restrictions are notable in several ways. First, the notice
29. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1482
(D.N.J. 1985). Accord Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir.
1979) (Congress intended the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision to "provide an alternative
enforcement mechanism" if the agencies fail to take appropriate action ....").
30. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 80 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1498 ("Citizens should be unconstrained to bring these ac-
tions, and ... the courts should not hesitate to consider them ...."). See also Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d at 172 ("Citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or trou-
blemakers .... The [Clean Water] Act seeks to encourage public participation rather than to
treat it as curiosity or a theoretical remedy.").
31. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1975). See also Carey, 535 F.2d at 172-73 ("Possible jurisdictional barriers to citizen actions,
such as amount in controversy and standing requirements, are expressly discarded by the
[Clean Air] Act.").
32. Friends II, 768 F.2d at 62 (discussing identical Clean Air Act provisions).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. _.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. -
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. ..
36. Train, 510 F.2d at 700.
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requirement safeguards against this danger of abuse by signalling to
the pertinent agency that there is a violation. Second, the sixty day
period allows the agency time to bring suit against the violator or
otherwise force compliance prior to commencement of the citizen
suit.3 7 The balance struck between unrestricted public access to the
courts and the restraints imposed by the statute essentially ensures
that all citizen suits will be heard unless such suits are rendered
unnecessary because of compliance efforts.
In addition to removing traditional restrictions on citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act, Congress also provided for the award
of litigation costs, where appropriate, to citizen suit litigants.38 This
provision was intended to bolster enforcement of the Act by encour-
aging citizens to bring meritorious actions against violators. 39 Re-
imbursement of litigation costs to citizen plaintiffs indicates that
Congress considered such plaintiffs to be performing a "public ser-
vice" for which they should be compensated.' That Congress
viewed citizen suits as vehicles to be promoted by awarding litiga-
tion costs is demonstrated by Congress' intention that such costs be
awarded anytime a citizen suit results in enforcement, regardless of
whether a verdict has been reached in the suit.41 Given Congress'
37. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1498 ("The time between notice and filing of the action
should give the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged viola-
tion ....").
It is appropriate that a government agency bring suit before private citizens because:
Congress intended to provide for citizens' suits in a manner that would be least
likely to clog already burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger governmen-
tal action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief. It was in response to
these concerns that the statutory notice provisions were included in [the Clean Air
Act].
City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. - ("The court... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever
the court determines such an award is appropriate.").
39. See Carey, 535 F.2d at 173 ("As additional encouragement [for citizens to sue viola-
tors of the Clean Air Act,] the Act expressly authorizes courts to award costs of litigation to
any party [prevailing or substantially prevailing] when appropriate.").
40. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HiS-
TORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1499 ("The Courts [sic] should recognize that in bringing legiti-
mate actions under this section citizens would be performing a public service and in such
instances, the courts should award costs of litigation to such party."). Litigation costs are not
available solely to citizen plaintiffs; the court may award such costs to whichever party
prevails in a citizen suit. Thus, the provision also discourages citizen plaintiffs from bringing
frivolous or harassing suits by allowing defendants to recover costs in such cases. See infra
notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
41. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1499. According to the legislative history,
19871
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intention to provide citizens liberal access to enforce the Act, as
well as the statutory safeguards against abusive litigation, a court-
developed doctrine that precludes citizen suits when no court action
has commenced appears to contravene Congress' intention.
In determining whether citizens should be allowed to sue viola-
tors under section 1365, courts are mindful that, in many cases, no
alternative relief is available to citizen plaintiffs. In a decision in-
volving water pollution, the Supreme Court has stated that the citi-
zen suit provisions preempt both private rights of action
independent of the Clean Water Act and federal common law nui-
sance actions.42 Although state common law remedies remain
available to citizens wishing to sue violators, state laws generally do
not contain pollution standards as rigorous as those in the Clean
Water Act.43 The citizen suit provision, therefore, may be the only
means by which citizens are able to enforce the Act's standards.
Consequently, courts should not impose restrictions on enforcement
methods beyond those intended by Congress.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZEN
SUIT PROVISION
A. Competing Judicial Approaches
1. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.
Prior to July 1985, courts interpreting the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision generally held that agency proceedings against
violators can, in some instances, preclude citizen suits.' Those
[the award of litigation costs under the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision]
should extend to plaintiffs in actions which result in successful abatement but do
not reach a verdict. For instance, if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a
verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation
expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such action.
Id. This statement of congressional intent was made regarding the pre-1987 provision award-
ing costs "to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." While
the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. _, amends this provision to
allow the award of costs only to "prevailing or substantially prevailing parties," such a plain-
tiff could still presumably recover costs on the ground that he substantially prevailed when
the defendant abated the violation.
42. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (private rights of action independent of the Clean Water Act preempted); City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (federal common law nuisance actions for water
pollution preempted).
43. T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 680 (1982).
44. Only courts within the Second and Third Circuits have confronted this issue. See
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759
F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985); Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979);
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp.
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courts were not consistent, however, in determining what sort of
agency action constitutes the equivalent of a court action. Baugh-
man v. Bradford Coal Co.,4 the first case to hold that some agency
actions constitute court action sufficient to preclude citizen suits, is
the paradigm preclusion precedent under both the Clean Water and
Clean Air Acts. The test enunciated by Baughman, however, was
itself imprecise, and variations developed by later courts have added
to the uncertainty surrounding the preclusion issue.
The Baughman test was originally developed to interpret the
Clean Air Act citizen suit provision.46 Essentially, "an administra-
tive board may be a 'court' if its powers and characteristics make
such a classification necessary to achieve statutory goals."'47 Fur-
thermore, the agency's enforcement ability must be sufficiently simi-
lar to that of a court.4" The agency's ability to impose injunctive
relief or civil penalties equal to those available through the courts
under the Clean Air Act should also be considered.49
Courts faced with determining whether a citizen suit is pre-
cluded under the Clean Water Act have often used this analysis.50
There is confusion, however, concerning whether agency action
1394 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600
F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1147 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd in part, 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Hudson River
Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd
in part sub nom. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985);
Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Love v. New York State
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gardeski v. Colonial Sand
& Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Similar interpretations have been applied
to the Clean Air Act.
45. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979). While the Baughman court allowed the citizen suit in
question, it stated that some agency actions could preclude such suits, and discussed the
standard to be applied in the determination. See supra notes 20-21; infra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
46. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 216.
47. Id. at 217.
48. See id. at 218. For agency action to preclude a citizen suit, "that tribunal must be
empowered to grant relief which will provide meaningful and effective enforcement of an
implementation plan." Id.
49. Id. The court found that since § 7413 of the Clean Air Act authorizes a court to
grant either injunctive relief or civil penalties up to $25,000 per day of violation, or both,
where the EPA sues the violator, Congress must have believed that effective enforcement of
the Act requires the availability of both these penalties. Thus, the court concluded that these
penalties must be available to an agency for that agency's enforcement ability to be sufficient
to preclude a citizen suit.
50. See, eg., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600
F. Supp. 1479, 1482 (D.N.J. 1985) (to preclude citizen suit, agency must be empowered to
grant an injunction or civil penalties up to $10,000 per day of violation, or both, as the courts
are authorized to do under § 1319 of the Clean Water Act).
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may be equivalent to a court action when the agency is "empowered
to grant relief which will provide meaningful and effective enforce-
ment.""1 The Third Circuit has indicated that the availability of
either injunctive relief or civil penalties may be sufficient for agency
action to substitute as a court proceeding; the controlling factor be-
ing "whether the coercive powers that the administrative agency
possesses compel compliance." 2 However, a District Court within
the Second Circuit has implied that an agency's general ability to
impose civil penalties, without regard to whether the penalties equal
those available in a court, is the appropriate factor.5 3 Thus, the
standard to decide whether an agency has available appropriate and
sufficient penalties is far from clear. As more courts hear the
agency action issue, the standard may become increasingly
imprecise.
An additional factor to be considered to determine whether the
agency is capable of enforcing the Act is whether citizens may inter-
vene in the proceeding. 4 Baughman, unfortunately, pointedly left
undecided whether an agency can constitute a "court" absent a
right to intervene in the agency's proceeding."
Court rulings after Baughman have created more conflict than
those decisions discussing the sufficiency of penalties available to an
agency. Several courts have followed Baughman's implication that
the right of citizen intervention may be an element in determining
the agency's enforcement ability. 6 The Western District of New
York has held that agency action cannot preclude a citizen suit
51. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 218 (emphasis added).
52. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott,
Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1985).
53. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1147,
1149 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter Friends I], rev'd in part, 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985)
("[factors employed [to determine whether agency action may preclude a Clean Water Act
citizen suit] ... include penalties available to the.., agency").
54. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 219 (right of citizens to intervene in agency action "may be
properly considered as one factor in determining whether a particular tribunal ... is a 'court'
for purposes of preclusion of citizen actions" under the Clean Air Act, since § 7604(b)(1)(B)
provides for such a right when agency brings court action against violator). If, like the Clean
Air Act, the Clean Water Act was promulgated to encourage citizen participation, then it
makes little sense to discount the ability to intervene in an extra-judicial proceeding. In other
words, to promote the purpose of both Acts, the right to intervene should be assiduously
protected regardless of the enforcement mechanism used by an agency.
55. Id. at 219 n.5 ("[W]e do not decide whether the lack of citizen intervention of right,
alone, is a sufficient basis to find an otherwise competent tribunal not to be a 'court'" for the
purposes of the citizen suit provision.).
56. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge &
Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1311, 1136 (3d Cir. 1985) (citizens' right to intervention is one of many
factors used in determining whether an agency constitutes a court under the citizen suit pro-
[VCol. 37:515
CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
where there is no right to citizen intervention,5 7 while the Northern
District of New York has held that the absence of such a right is
irrelevant. 58 The Third Circuit has also implied that a variety of
procedural safeguards must be present for an agency action to con-
stitute a court proceeding. These safeguards include holding hear-
ings before independent decisionmakers, the opportunity for
opposing parties to present evidence and call witnesses, and the
preparation and maintenance of formal transcripts and records of
decisions.5 9 Plainly, Baughman and its progeny provide no clear
guidelines for future courts to determine whether an agency action
can be considered a court proceeding for purposes of the citizen suit
provision.
In addition to requiring that agency action must be the
equivalent of a court proceeding, the Clean Water Act citizen suit
provision also requires that the action be diligently prosecuted.60
Thus, even if an agency action is found sufficiently equivalent to a
court proceeding, the action must also meet the diligent prosecution
requirement. 61  As with the sufficiency of the agency action, the
courts have not clearly defined what diligent prosecution means.62
The first case to discuss the issue, Gardeski v. Colonial Sand &
Stone Co. ,63 indicated that the diligent prosecution requirement was
imposed "to assure Congress, the courts, and the public that agency
enforcement efforts were real and sufficient." 64 Real and sufficient
prosecution, combined with prompt agency efforts to enforce the
Act's requirements, would meet the diligent prosecution require-
ment.65 The court further stated that a formal proceeding was re-
quired. To qualify as a formal proceeding,
vision); Friends I, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1149 (factors to be considered include
"whether the administrative proceedings afforded citizens the right to intervene").
57. Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 830 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
58. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. Supp. 345,
349-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd in part sub nom. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 758 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (availability of penalties substantially similar to those of a
court sufficient in itself for an agency action to preclude a citizen suit).
59. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc, 759 F.2d at 1136-38.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 1004, 101 Stat.
61. See Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(even though agency qualified as a "court," citizen suit under the Clean Air Act not pre-
cluded because agency action did not constitute "diligent prosecution").
62. Id. at 1164 ("No judicial guidance exists as to what constitutes diligent
prosecution.").
63. 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. Id. at 1168.
65. Id. at 1166.
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the [agency must] ...designate a hearing officer, who would
possess substantial independence of judgment and action. [The
agency] would have had to assign sufficient personnel to prepare
the case against [the violator], and to meet deadlines set by the
hearing officer. Citizens and environmental groups would have
been free to attend the proceeding, and more significantly to in-
tervene and participate as parties. Settlements would still have
been possible, but the adequacy of any proposed settlement
would be considered by the hearing officers, and intervenors
would be given at least an opportunity to comment.... Had no
settlement been achieved, findings and conclusions would have
accompanied the hearing officer's recommendation to the Com-
missioner. The Commissioner's determination would have been
appealable, not only by the [violator], but also by citizens or
interventors.
66
Later court opinions have not always followed Gardeski's formal
agency requirement to define diligent prosecution. Several courts
have held that a consent order alone is sufficient, provided the
agency enforces the order.67 One court has even held that a consent
order which provides only for "eventual" compliance with the Act
constitutes diligent prosecution.6" Like the court action require-
ment, the diligent prosecution requirement is vague and imprecise.
There are few guidelines for future courts to follow if they accept
that agency actions may occasionally preclude citizen suits.
2. The Second Circuit's Disavowal of Baughman
In Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,69 the Second
Circuit explicitly rejected the Baughman test and its variations.7"
Friends II held that only a judicial proceeding can preclude a citi-
zen suit under section 1365(b) of the Clean Water Act; agency ac-
tion alone is never sufficient to preclude such a suit. 71 The court,
basing its decision on the language of the statute, stated that "[t]he
Clean Water Act citizen suit provision unambiguously and without
qualification refers to an 'action in a court of the United States, or a
State.' . . . It would be inappropriate to expand this language to
66. Id. at 1168.
67. See Friends I, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1149 ("[A] consent order may be suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirement of diligent prosecution [unless] the... agency fails to monitor
compliance with the order or if insufficient corrective action is taken by the polluter."); Sierra
Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 831 n.3 (an agency "may... fail the test of diligent
prosecution if it fails to adequately monitor or enforce the consent order.").
68. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F. Supp. at
351-52.
69. 758 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
70. Id. at 62.
71. Id. at 62-63.
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include administrative enforcement actions." 72
The court, not content to rest its decision on the statutory lan-
guage, also examined the legislative history of the Act. Friends II
noted that "Conrail has not cited to and our own research has failed
to disclose any indication that Congress meant other than what it
plainly stated in [section 1365(b)]." 73 Focusing on Congress' intent
to encourage citizen participation in enforcement of the Act,74 and
on the statutory safeguards against unlimited citizen actions, 75 the
court concluded that "[t]o interpret section [1365(b)] to include ad-
ministrative as well as judicial proceedings [as preclusions to citizen
suits] is in our view contrary to both the plain language of the stat-
ute and congressional intent."'76 On the basis of these considera-
tions, as well as various policy factors,7 7 this approach is clearly
preferable to that enunciated in Baughman.
B. Criticism of the Baughman Approach
1. Unpersuasive Policy Rationales
The Baughman court provided scant justification for adopting
the view that agency action may preclude citizen suits by generally
asserting that "an administrative board may be a 'court' if its pow-
ers and characteristics make such a classification necessary to
achieve statutory goals."'78  Several policy arguments support
Baughman's reasoning. These arguments are rendered moot how-
ever, because they are remedied by the statute and, in some cases,
common law.79 Policy considerations to be examined include possi-
ble frivolous and harassing citizen suits, danger of multiple suits
against one violator, and the risk of inconsistent enforcement of the
Act's standards.
Excessive concern for citizen plaintiffs bringing frivolous and
harassing suits, although understandable, is unwarranted given
Congress' clear intention to encourage citizen suits in these cases. 80
72. Id. at 62.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 63.
77. See infra notes 79-116 and accompanying text.
78. 592 F.2d at 217.
79. See Friends II, 758 F.2d at 62. "The court [in Student Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.] failed to question or even to
comment on the strength of the basis for, or the soundness of, the Baughman formulation."
Id.
80. See supra notes 15-34 and accompanying text; Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 4, at
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Two factors substantially reduce the likelihood of meritless suits.
First, the statute authorizes the court to award litigation costs to
the "prevailing or substantially prevailing" party where "appropri-
ate."81 Congress acknowledged that frivolous and harassing citizen
suits could be deterred by awarding litigation costs to defendants in
such cases.82 Furthermore, although the same provision authorizes
the court to award costs to prevailing citizen plaintiffs, the provision
is unlikely to encourage citizens to bring suits which they would not
otherwise bring because they must bear the initial expense
themselves.83
The second statutory barrier against excessive or meritless liti-
gation is that citizen plaintiffs cannot collect civil damages in citizen
suits against violators of the Clean Water Act. Although the statute
provides for civil penalties to be assessed against such violators, 4
those penalties are deposited into the Treasury, rather than directly
distributed to citizen plaintiffs.8 5 The lack of civil damages removes
333-35 (original House bill would have authorized suits by only those citizens within the
geographical area having a direct interest that may be infringed). The final conference ver-
sion, however, only limited standing to those "having an interest which is or may be ad-
versely affected." S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 145-46 (1972), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 328-29. Accord Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part sub nom. Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975) ("Congress made it clear that considera-
tions of economic cost or technical feasibility were always to be subordinate to considerations
of public health [in enforcement of the Clean Air Act].").
81. 33 U.S. C. § 1365(d) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. -.
82.
[T]he courts may award costs of litigation [to the prevailing party] ... whenever the
court determines that such action is in the public interest. The court could thus
award costs of litigation to defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous
or harrassing. This should have the effect of discouraging abuse of [the citizen suit]
provision.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 1415, 1499. See also H.R REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1972), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 753, 821 (By providing for an award of litigation
costs to the prevailing party, "the Committee is satisfied that defendants who were subjected
to needless harassment or frivolous suits may be reimbursed for their expenses. This should
have the effect of discouraging abuse of the 'citizen suit' provision."). See Schwartz & Hack-
ett, supra note 4, at 367 ("Congress sought to provide for attorneys' fees in two circum-
stances: (1) to a plaintiff who performs 'a public service' in litigation brought under an
environmental statute, and (2) to a defendant subjected to 'frivolous or harassing'
litigation.").
83. Feller, supra note 15, at 564 ("[E]conomic disincentives may stifle the prospective
plaintiffs' initiative. . . . The expectation that plaintiffs may be reimbursed by the court
through an award of fees does not remove the immediate burden of such expenses.").
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. _.
85. "[A]ny [civil] penalties imposed [as the result of a Clean Water Act citizen suit]
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a powerful incentive to a citizen bringing frivolous and harassing
actions.86 Thus, there is no need to further restrict citizen suits by
holding that certain agency action precludes them to prevent un-
warranted litigation.
The prospect of multiple litigation against one violator may fur-
ther support Baughman's approach. However, the concept of vir-
tual representation alleviates much of the concern about multiple
litigation. According to this doctrine, a plaintiff is barred from
bringing an action against a defendant if that defendant has already
been sued by a plaintiff having essentially the same interests as the
prospective plaintiff.87 This doctrine may be particularly effective
in deterring multiple Clean Water Act citizen suits, because citizen
plaintiffs are often viewed as "private attorneys general." Conse-
quently, one citizen suit against a violator may serve to bar all other
citizen suits against the same violator.88 Moreover, the Clean
Water Act expressly bars multiple citizen suits where the agency is
"diligently prosecuting" the violator in a court action.8 9 The risk of
multiple citizen litigation against a single violator, therefore, is
slight. Thus, like the fear of frivolous and harassing suits, multiple
litigation is an insufficient reason to find that some agency actions
should preclude citizen suits.
A third possible policy justification for Baughman is that if citi-
zens are allowed to sue violators under the Act even after the
agency has undertaken some action to force compliance, such suits
will result in inconsistent enforcement of the Act. Congress ad-
dressed this issue and discounted it on the ground that, under the
Act, the EPA must formulate the applicable environmental stan-
dards. Only these standards must be enforced, regardless of
whether the agency or a citizen seeks enforcement.
would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts and not be recovered by the complainant." S.
REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 1415, 1497. See also Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 4, at 337 ("The courts have
recognized that citizen plaintiffs may not sue for damages accruing to themselves under
§ 1365. They may, however, seek civil penalties which must be paid into the Federal
Treasury.").
86. See Feller, supra note 15, at 564 ("Since private enforcement precludes recovery of
damages, plaintiffs are deprived of a powerful, personal motive to sue. In addition, citizens
must consider the economic risk of liability for defendants' attorneys fees.").
87. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 501 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Miss. 1980),
modified on other grounds sub nom, Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983
(5th Cir. 1981) (under doctrine of virtual representation, res judicata will bar plaintiff from
suing if the defendant has already been sued by plaintiff with essentially similar interests).
88. See Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 4, at 362-63.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982)., as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat.
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The standards for which enforcement would be sought either
under administrative enforcement or through citizen enforce-
ment procedures are the same. Therefore, the participation of
citizens in the courts seeking enforcement of water pollution con-
trol requirements should not result in inconsistent policy....
[T]he issue before the courts would be a factual one of whether
there had been compliance.
90
Congress provided protection against inconsistent enforcement
by explicitly allowing the EPA to intervene in any citizen suit,91
presumably to ensure uniform enforcement of the Act's standards.92
Furthermore, the only effective cause of action which a citizen may
have against a violator is that authorized by the Act's citizen suit
provision. This provision has been held to preempt any private
right of action independent of the Act.93 Thus, the only standards
which could be enforced by a citizen suit are those established by
the agency. Since the Act was designed to prevent inconsistent en-
forcement, prohibiting citizen suits as a result of certain agency ac-
tions is a needless restriction.
2. Vagueness Causing Uncertain Enforcement
The Baughman test is unclear and offers only general guide-
lines.94 Courts following Baughman have formulated a variety of
tests determining when an agency constitutes a "court." Often-
times, the tests directly conflict. 95 The second analytical tier deal-
ing with diligent prosecution has produced equally confusing
results.96 Most cases subsequent to Baughman, although finding
90. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1498. See also id. at 79, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 1415, 1497:
[Section 1365] would not substitute a "common law" or court-developed definition
of water quality. An alleged violation of an effluent control limitation or standard,
would not require reanalysis of technological in [sic] other considerations at the
enforcement stage. These matters will have been settled in the administrative pro-
cedure leading to the establishment of such effluent control provision. Therefore,
an objective evidentiary standard will have to be met by any citizen who brings an
action under this section.
Id.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1982), as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. -.
92. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F.
Supp. 1479, 1483 (D.N.J. 1985) (Section 1365(c)(2) "gives the EPA the right to intervene in
any citizen's suit. Should the EPA feel that this suit interferes with its attempts to secure
compliance with the Act, it may avail itself of this right.").
93. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 44-49, 51, 54, 55 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 44, 50, 52, 53, 56-59 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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that citizen suits may sometimes be precluded by agency action,
have allowed the particular citizen suits to proceed. 97 Nevertheless,
the vagueness of Baughman-type tests as well as the absence of clear
guidelines for courts to follow present a real threat to enforcement
of the Clean Water Act.
The danger of nonenforcement is exemplified by the holding in
Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,98
which allowed an agency proceeding to frustrate a citizen suit under
the Baughman analysis. Although there was no right to citizen in-
tervention in the agency proceeding, the Hudson River court never-
theless held that the agency constituted a 'court,' based on its ability
to impose injunctive relief and civil penalties similar to those avail-
able to a court.99 The court, furthermore, held that the agency con-
sent order, which required only eventual compliance, constituted
diligent prosecution. In so holding, the court stated that "[t]o the
extent the consent order has brought Conrail into eventual compli-
ance.. ., it is irrelevant that certain post order violations have not
been the subject of independent prosecution."" °
Fortunately, Hudson River was reversed by the Second Circuit
in Friends I 101 Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's reversal, it is
by no means certain that future courts will hold that a particular
agency action has not met the threshhold for preclusion of a citizen
suit. Once that conclusion has been reached the prohibition on citi-
zen suits will thwart the purposes of the Act.
The danger behind the vagueness of the Baughman approach
lies in the fact that agencies may not be as strict in enforcing the
97. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott,
Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985); Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985);
Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979); Student Pub. Interest Re-
search Group of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394 (D.N.J. 1985);
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479
(D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Love v. New
York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gardeski v.
Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See Schwartz & Hackett,
supra note 4, at 347:
[Tihe courts... have uniformly found that an administrative proceeding or order
could be deemed to be in a "court" for the purposes of the "diligent prosecution"
provision of section 1365(b). The courts often have found, however, that such ad-
ministrative enforcement activity has failed the "diligent prosecution" test for other
reasons.
98. 591 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd in part sub nor. Friends of the Earth v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
99. 591 F. Supp. at 347, 349-50.
100. Id. at 351 n.5.
101. 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Clean Water Act as was intended by Congress. Although the Act's
pollution standards are initially established by the EPA, the EPA
and state agencies may be lax in enforcing them. There are several
reasons for such passive enforcement, including delay in agency
proceedings, lobbying pressure from violators, and the apparent
willingness of agencies to allow deviations from the set standards. 
1 0 2
The courts following Baughman have generally failed to recognize
that these reasons work against exclusive agency enforcement.
10 3
Nonetheless, these factors must be addressed and, in light of Con-
gress' expressed desire to allow liberal citizen access to the courts as
an aid to effective enforcement,"° the Baughman approach must be
abandoned.
The tendency of administrative agencies toward delay and inac-
tion is well known.'0 5 Even when an agency has instituted some
enforcement proceeding, it may be a considerable amount of time
before the violator is forced to comply, if ever.'0 6 It is clear that one
of the purposes behind allowing citizens to sue violators of the
Clean Water and Air Acts is "to stir slumbering agencies and to
circumvent bureaucratic inaction that interferes with the scheduled
satisfaction of the ... goals."'0 7 To preclude citizen suits simply
because an agency has taken some action would be to run the risk
that the Act will never be enforced against a particular violator.
A second factor contributing to lack of effective agency enforce-
ment is the political pressure put on agencies by special interest
groups and particularly by large corporate violators.
The major problem in pollution control is the vast economic and
political power of large polluters. Water pollution exists, in large
102. See infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
103. See Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1167 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("Agency enforcement policy [under the Clean Air Act], when it is reasonable in light
of the difficulties posed by a given set of circumstances, should be protected from disruption
by private efforts."); id. at 1163 (suggesting that an agency proceeding may preclude a citizen
suit if it might result in "substantially the same relief that could be obtained from a court")
(emphasis added); id. at 1166 (implying that a consent order which would require the violator
to comply with the law "in some enforceable form" is sufficient to preclude a citizen suit)
(emphasis added); Hudson River Sloop, 591 F. Supp. at 351-52 (citizen suit precluded where
agency and violator had entered consent order providing for eventual compliance).
104. See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
105. See, eg., Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 429, 432 (1960) (regulatory agencies can handle delays and burdens which should not
be placed on the judiciary).
106. See, eg., Note, Federal Water Pollution Laws: A Critical Lack of Enforcement by
the Environmental Protection Agency, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 945, 947 (1983) (administrative
delay is a factor which diminishes the EPA's effectiveness in enforcing environmental laws).
107. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1976).
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part, because polluters have more influence over government
than do those they "pollute." As long as this disproportionate
influence persists, so will the pollution. It is a mistake to suppose
that new laws with higher cleanup requirements and tougher
penalties will ultimately succeed in eliminating environmental
contamination; unless new laws also tip the scales of influence
over government in favor of the public, the requirements they set
will be consistently violated and the penalties rarely used.
10 8
Agencies under pressure from violators tend to delay enforcement
proceedings or to overlook certain violations, "becoming the arm of
industries they are supposed to regulate."109 While courts hold that
agency action may preclude Clean Water Act citizen suits, they
overlook the danger that political pressure may prevent agency ac-
tion from being as stringent as it could be.
A final cause of ineffective agency enforcement is that the gov-
ernment has shown a tendency to take a relaxed approach in enforc-
ing the Act's standards.110 Decisions modeled after Baughman
retain the possibility that minimal agency action might preclude a
citizen suit brought to compel compliance. Train v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council Inc.,'11 presents such an example. Train
did not involve a citizen suit; rather, the Natural Resources Defense
Council sued the EPA directly for not strictly enforcing the Clean
Air Act standards against a particular violator. The EPA's enforce-
ment of standards allowed variations, such as dispersion of pollu-
tants. Instead of reducing pollution, this practice merely dilutes it
by spreading the pollutants over a broader geographical area.1
12
The Supreme Court held that the EPA could properly grant
such variances, although the requirements of the Clean Air Act are
not achieved.11 An agency's frequent explanation for its failure to
108. D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 395 (1971).
109. Note, supra note 106, at 953 (citing J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 171
(1955)). Such law enforcement is also likely to result when political pressure is applied to
state agencies since the continued existence of large industry within a state or region will
greatly affect the economic well-being of the state. Id.
110. See Note, supra note 106, at 945 ("The problems in enforcement [of environmental
laws] are rooted in the EPA's discretionary power not to enforce. This discretionary power
has resulted in a critical lack of enforcement in the federal government's attempts to clean up
the nation's waters."). The EPA's passivity may be due, in part, to the absence of mandatory
enforcement provisions.
111. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
112. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 394(5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd in part sub nom. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
113. In approving the variance allowing dispersion, the Supreme Court did not address
the principle of non-degradation. See Note, Enforcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, 10 URB. L. ANN. 294, 303 (1975). "[tlhe dispersion enhancement strategy ... [ap-
proved in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc] ignored the principle of non-
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enforce the Act's requirement by granting variances is that the re-
quirements "are difficult to enforce for policy or economic consider-
ations." '114  However, "Congress has made it clear that
considerations of economic cost or technical feasibility were always
to be subordinate to considerations of public health... [and] were
not to be considered in meeting the three-year deadlines for attain-
ing national primary standards."1 5 Thus, Congress intended for
the agencies to enforce the Act to their fullest ability.
Where the courts will allow suboptimal enforcement of the Act,
the danger of ineffective enforcement may prohibit citizen suits
under some formulations of the Baughman test. Congress recog-
nized that agency enforcement efforts are often conservative, and
subsequently enacted the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision as
a remedy. 1 6 Compliance with the Act's purpose requires the
courts to abandon the Baughman approach, thereby avoiding the
risk of ineffective agency action which might preclude needed citi-
zen suits.
III. CONCLUSION
The Friends II holding, that Clean Water Act citizen suits are
only precluded when the EPA or a state environmental agency is
diligently prosecuting a violator, should serve as the model to future
courts faced with this issue. Although a minority position, 1 7 it is
degradation implicit in the federal law." Id. The principle of non-degradation "means that a
state [or the EPA] must not allow the present quality of the air to deteriorate, even if the air
quality level is above the national standards set by the Clean Air Act Amendments." Id. at
303. The Supreme Court inferred this principle from the Act's language, stating that the
purpose of the Act is to "protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air resources." Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1875(b). The Clean Water Act contains similar language: "[the purpose of
the Act is] to restore and maintain the ... integrity of the Nation's waters." See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1977). Dispersion methodology may actually result in an increase in air pollution.
See Note, supra, at 303-04:
Given the present saturation levels of the atmosphere and inefficiency of dispersion
methodology, the [variance allowed in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Ina] ... may result in an increase in pollution not only in the local area but in
adjacent regions as well, thus violating the principle of non-degradation. Overall,
dispersion enhancement techniques are questionable pollution control devices and
should be used ... only as a last resort.
114. Feller, supra note 15, at 569.
115. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d at 411-12, rev'd in part
sub nom. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
116. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970) ("Government initiative in
seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to
bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental agencies charged with
the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings.").
117. See supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
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better supported by the plain language of the citizen suit provi-
sion"S and the legislative history. 19 The conflicting doctrine enun-
ciated by Baughman 120 and its progeny, which prohibits citizen
suits under some circumstances where an agency has instituted its
own proceedings against a violator, 121 contravenes Congress' lan-
guage and purpose. In addition, the Baughman doctrine is unsup-
ported by possible policy considerations restricting citizens' access
to the courts. By and large, the Clean Water Act reflects policy
questions already settled by Congress.
1 22
Baughman and subsequent cases should also yield to the Friends
II approach because they have resulted in conflicting tests to deter-
mine the circumstances under which agency action alone will bar
citizen suits.1 23 The principal danger of Baughman is that courts
adopting this doctrine run the risk of hindering enforcement of the
Clean Water Act by allowing preclusion of citizen suits. This risk is
augmented when responsible agencies are unable or unwilling to
strictly enforce the Act's requirements.1 24 Consequently, courts
facing the problem of interpreting the Clean Water Act citizen suit
provision should abandon the Baughman approach and adopt the
Friends II approach which would preclude citizen suits only when
the agency is diligently prosecuting a court action against the viola-
tor. In this manner, the courts can implement Congress' purpose of
augmenting enforcement of the Act through citizen suits.
GAIL J. ROBINSON
118. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
120. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra note 45.
121. See supra note 118.
122. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
123. See id.
124. See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
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